This market will resolve YES if and when Wikipedia's English page on the Russo-Ukrainian War (or the nearest equivalent if that page no longer exists) lists in its infobox "Result: Ukrainian victory", and I am satisfied that this is not part of an edit war.
It will also resolve YES if the result describes the victor as some coalition of which Ukraine is a part, or describes the outcome in terms of the defeated side being Russia or some coalition of which Russia is a part.
Any other "result" after the war is no longer described by Wikipedia as "ongoing" will cause the market to resolve NO, including hedged statements like "Partial Ukrainian victory" or "Ukrainian victory with territorial losses".
Resolution only depends on the first, non-dotpoint statement in the "result" section of the infobox. If hedging/concessions follow the intitial statement as dotpoints, or if they appear in the body of the article, this is not relevant to resolution. If the "result" comprises only dotpoints, the market will resolve NO.
The closing date for this market will be extended as needed until the market can resolve.
1,000
3.00So the Biden regime, after suggesting that allowing ATACMS targeting Russian territory would not make a big enough difference in the war relative to the escalatory risk such policy would pose, has decided to do this anyway. And rather than frame it as a reaction to actions by Russia (e.g. NK troops), it has instead been framed (due to lack of alternative rationale) as an explicit escalatory measure, presumably to try to force a larger confrontation with Russia since that would make Trump's goal of extricating the US from that conflict more difficult.
My question to people bullish in YES given this development is: how much of that incremental YES% is due to ATACMS making a difference versus that decusion triggering an escalation that may further stress the Russian government?
@MalachiteEagle totally irrational, given that Dems don't have a path to victory either. All they have is "we just gave another $X billion to Ukraine" -- yeah, but what is happening on the ground there?
@MalachiteEagle Ah, that. Sorry, thought it was a reaction to the election given the NK troops have been there for days.
@AlQuinn oh it's definitely the election. I was just responding to the question about what's actually happening on the ground
@AlQuinn except Wikipedia will probably declare a Ukrainian victory on the basis of Kiev still existing even after they give up all the russian speaking regions
@AlQuinn easy target for secondary sanctions. I think the west prefers Russia to be forced to get these products through smaller countries though. It's harder to pressure larger countries.
@TibaltMichel Russia doesn't need to do that in order for Ukraine to not win by the criteria here. Meanwhile, Ukraine is still begging the US for permission to conduct longer range attacks:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/21/zelensky-ukraine-biden-weapons-plea/
I'm sure Jill will have a decision for Mr. Zelensky soon enough. There is no leadership coming from the White House on this; they are doing just enough to keep up appearances, but there is no real will to win the war, which would require incurring some risk. Compare this to what Israel is doing against Hamas and Hezbollah; that is what trying to win looks like.
@AlQuinn For Russia, securing Donbass and Crimea isn't enough for a victory, if Ukraine enters EU and NATO. Before deciding who is winning or will win the war, we must define what is a victory.
@TibaltMichel I don't think Russia will "win" either by a reasonable definition of the word. I expect this to become a frozen conflict (as I have since early 2023), unless Trump gets into office and negotiates an end to the madness. Note I want Ukraine to win and Russia to lose; just tired of the bullshit where Ukraine allies aren't actually trying to win.
@AlQuinn Believing that Trump could end anything is pure nonsense. He failed to end the frozen conflict when he was still in office. And his VP candidate repeatedly stated how much he "cares" about Ukraine.
The West doesn't care if Ukraine wins or loses the war, episode #147:
The main thrust of the reluctance to allow Ukraine to actually have full use of the weapons provided seems to be coming from the White House, from whatever unelected politburo is in charge there (we can now safely say it's not Biden, of course).
Ukrainian incursion into Russia:
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr7rn98l8kjo
(I see this as being bearish for Ukranian victory; in my model, Ukraine will be adventurous in proportion to how desperate their situation is)
They are (very slowly) still losing territory in Ukraine. This incursion is of limited strategic value and will be repulsed soon enough. The only way I see Ukraine winning by the criteria set forth here would require some sort of political collapse in Moscow. The Ukranians have punched well above their weight but Russia has adapted and can grind out a war of attrition indefinitely. Can you (or anyone) sketch out a path where Ukraine wins on the battlefield?
Really? This is months old but it suggests Russia has the clear advantage:
I didn't research specific claims except I did previously look into just 155mm artillery (below) where it was clear Russia was not just ahead, but dominant.
Why will this war result in stalemate or some degree of Russian victory? Because the Russians are serious, while the west is a bunch of bloviating dilettantes. The West is clearly not playing to win. If it was, Ukraine would have these better weapons you suggested.
Can you (or anyone) sketch out a path where Ukraine wins on the battlefield?
I think the primary variable determining the course of this war is the influx of men from mobilisation waves. UA had manpower advantage during the Kharkiv and Cherson offensives, which regained lots of territory. Then RU mobilised and started the slow grind, gaining ground slowly. I hear the bulk of the recent UA conscripts will enter the battlefield around October, while RU is anticipated to mobilise lots of people in near future and they won't affect the balance until next year.
It would appear that UA gains much more during periods of its relative advantage compared to what RU does. I believe they could plausibly win on the battlefield if they did another brilliant maneuver operation. I do not think it is likely, and I agree the market is probably overvalued.
I suspect there are fundamental reasons due to the more flexible / delegated structure of (parts of) UA forces compared to the mostly Soviet-like RU ones that enable UA to achieve more with fewer resources. The RU have been adapting, but I suspect there are fundamental limits on how far they can adapt within the country's archaic system of governance (trade-off between coup-proofing and giving autonomy to commanders).
How many people are being mobilized at once in each wave versus how many are already deployed at the time? I would expect the net % added by a mobilization wave would not be big enough to materially matter, and instead, all it does is counteract the effect of attrition. Is the absolute size of Ukraine's army growing, and if so, is it growing proportional to that of Russia?