What percent do you need to be at to update your war plans?

https://nypost.com/2024/01/15/news/germany-preparing-for-russia-to-start-world-war-3/

@parhizj As the article says, it's one of a host of war-gaming scenarios, and considered "the worst-case scenario".

German Defense Ministry officials would not address specific scenarios laid out in the document, but told BILD: “I can tell you that considering different scenarios, even if they are extremely unlikely, are part of everyday military business, especially in training.”

For the last 4 years I have been significantly changing my life plans in expectation of Russia's attack on Nato.

My own percent (for the same question, but with 2033 deadline) is above 60%.

may i ask for your reasoning behind >60% probability of rus-nato war by 2033? metaculus gives it 15% by 2027

I have read the publications that Putin and Medvedev published, and the authors that Putin refers to as his favourite philosophers. It is an absolute crazy "russia is the top nation" nazi collection. In addition to that I have no doubts left that he feels as his personal "mission from god" to reestablish ussr.

According to their logic, everything that at any point was rus territory, is "within their right to take back".

If ukraine gives up, it will only bring him closer to his aim and allow him the preparation of the same story against Baltic countries.

I know that metaculus is low on that, I was making the prediction there too.

There is no power division in Russia. Such an event would be a solo-person decision. So I predict the probability of Putin deciding to play a global war. If we look at conditional "putin is not dead by 2033 and is still in power" then i would say the probability is up to 80+%.

Medvedev (and people like Dugin, if that's who you're referring to) are certainly terrifying to listen to - in fact, a think the working theory among many Russia-watchers is that this is precisely their role: to make extreme statements (now that Zhirinovski is no more), and to make Putin look moderate in comparison. However, I'd push back on Putin himself as well as his goals and methods.

First, goals. I don't think he has any intention to reestablish the USSR. Sure, if everyone came crawling back and asked to be taken under Russian control, he probably wouldn't say no - although even then, I'm not sure he'd actually want to have a single state. But while there's the (in)famous "USSR collapse was the worst geopolitical catastrophe of the century" quote, and while he has certainly come to regard some territories and peoples as "Russian" over the past years, there's no indication that he has any ambitions to incorporate Astana, or Vilnius, or even Tbilisi. He does want to make Russia great again, yes, but I don't think there's much to indicate that this has to be achieved by conquering territory.

Much has been said about why he nevertheless did attack Ukraine. I think the main idea here is that Putin is actually a very risk-averse person, both personally and politically. Yes, he'll gamble if he thinks he has much to gain and the risks are low - like with Crimea in 2014 or with Ukraine in 2022, with the difference that he turned out to be right in the first case, and quite wrong in the second. But I think it's quite clear that he expected a Crimea-style quick, effortless and perhaps even largely non-violent victory in 2022 as well, without much pushback by either Ukraine or the "collective West".

I guess a good example is Russia's relationship with Turkey. Russia knows Turkey is a valuable trading hub, so it lets it supply Ukraine with weapons (which were spectacularly useful at the very start of the war). Russia knows it can't afford a conflict, so it lets Turkey help Azerbaijan inflict several defeats upon its traditional ally and fellow Orthodox nation Armenia, ignoring Russian security guarantees and thus making it clear that Russia can't be counted upon to provide support when push comes to shove.

So I think there are only to scenarios where a Russia-NATO conflict has any significant likelihood: either Putin sees an opportunity to get a quick win without there being much risk of retaliation (for example, if he thinks NATO won't protect some particular region); or if he assumes a NATO attack on Russia is imminent and he has to act first. Now, I think both are possible, given the obviously highly selective flow of information reaching Putin; however, both seem very unlikely. Despite what some pundits have been saying, there has been little indication of Putin being irrational, much less suicidal; he has been making decisions based on wrong premises, but there's a limit to how wrong intelligence can be, and he certainly will be more wary of possible consequences of attacking a NATO country, given how wrong he turned out to be about Ukraine.

And, by the way - the Metaculus market is not just much lower at 15%, it's also not really about a full-scale war, but only about any conflict involving casualties. Thus, the probability for what would colloquially be called a war would be significantly lower.

Dugin is not a public person. He cannot make Putin look moderate, in Russia only deeply politically minded people even know the existance of Dugin.

Putin has truncated all other ways for the country greatness. He literally chose the path of expansion.

Propaganda is a resource. It is spend to create hate against Nato in even higher degree, than against ukraine.

Spending money on that (if he does not plan to direct conflict) is either irrational, or it is what it looks like: preparation of the sheep-minded people to hate the enemy.

You incorrectly use "Russia" when "Putin" must be said. Russia does not have a mechanism, it is not an emergenr behaviour of branches of power. The system in Russia is monolithically centered on one person. And that person just does not care about Turkey, because it is always trying "to sit on both chairs".

Turned out to be right in Crimea???

Turned out to be right in Crimea???

Yes, I think that Putin expected a quick conquest of Crimea with few losses and few negative consequences, and I think he got it. Do you see it differently?

You incorrectly use "Russia" when "Putin" must be said. [...] The system in Russia is monolithically centered on one person.

I assumed it was reasonably clear what I meant. Of course, the crucial decisions are made by Putin; however, I think it is OK to talk about Russian decisions, and even more sense to talk about Russian guarantees or aggression. After all, you're not afraid of a Putin-NATO war :)

Russia does not have a mechanism, it is not an emergenr behaviour of branches of power.

Not sure what you mean here.

Propaganda is a resource. It is spend to create hate against Nato in even higher degree, than against ukraine.

Spending money on that (if he does not plan to direct conflict) is either irrational, or it is what it looks like: preparation of the sheep-minded people to hate the enemy.

Sure, there's loads of anti-NATO propaganda. But for Putin (and thus, for Russia) NATO already
is the enemy - because Ukraine is denied any significant agency, because Russia can't be losing (or not winning) against Ukraine, because Russia needs to be massively beleaguered in order to be the victim, not the aggressor. We don't need an intent to go to war to explain it.

Putin has truncated all other ways for the country greatness. He literally chose the path of expansion.

I don't think it's how he sees it. I assume he sees Russia as already being great by standing up to the aggressive, imperialistic, decadent West.

Dugin is not a public person. He cannot make Putin look moderate, in Russia only deeply politically minded people even know the existance of Dugin.

I agree, Dugin is only relevant for a very specific audience (and I'm not even sure this audience includes Putin). I just don't know whom you were referring to originally.

Thank for splitting answer nicely in sections. I would like to answer each line, but i am too busy. (With my addiction to discussions, the dialogue could take months, if you are involved into the theme like me.)

So, i choose the main points before leaving.

1) Anti Nato propaganda started before crimea.

2) I did refer to Dugin as one of those. I just say his direct audience is almost exclusively Putin. He is not there to contrast Putin, Putin just likes the ideas and gives them spread through The First tv channel. Same with other "philosophers".

3) Let'say Ukraine gives up. What do you think will be the next point in Putin's programme(plans)?

Sounds very sensible.

1) Agreed. It kind of went away during the 90ies, but started up again (I guess) after the NATO intervention of Yugoslavia, and has been ramping up in phases ever since.

2) I'm not sure there's much evidence of Putin actually paying much attention to Dugin; not sure which other "philosophers" you're referring to.

3) Actually, I'm not sure he has a program, or long-term plans. Mark Galeotti likes to say that, while Putin is sometimes is viewed in the West as playing chess, he's much more of a political judoka - he tries to find an opponent's weaknesses and situational advantages, while remaining flexible in both his goals and methods.

Let me state what my main counterargument probably boils down to: To me, the default answer to "How likely is an unfriendly country to attack NATO?" is "<<5%", for reasons which are probably obvious, and it would take really strong arguments to move that to anywhere near your numbers. To me, anti-NATO propaganda and Medvedev's crazy statements don't move the needle much. The attack on Ukraine does, but not that much, for reasons I explained in the previous comment (Ukraine is a special case, and I'm pretty sure Putin made a mistake in attacking it, even from his point of view).